China's High Saving Puzzle
Over the past two decades, one defining feature of the Chinese economy has been its extraordinarily high and r ising saving rate (Ma and Wang, 2010; Yang, Zhang and Z hou, 2012; Yang, 2012) . China saves more than half of its GDP, exceeding all OECD economies, overtaking Singapore as the top Asian saver, and r anking the highest among all global economies of meaningful size.
China is an outlier in the prediction of aggregate saving from a wide range of empirical models. Moreover, China's saving rate has been exceptionally high relative to its own history. Its gross national saving rate fluctuated at around 35 percent to 40 percent of GDP in 1980-1999, followed by a persistent upsurge reaching 53 percent of GDP in 2010.
Framing the Chinese economy in the context of its saving-investment balance is useful. By definition, aggregate saving plus consumption is equal to GDP; thus, a high and rising saving rate implies a l ow and falling consumption rate. China's aggregate consumption to GDP ratio declined from 62 percent in 1992 to 47 percent in 2010. However, China's private consumption has been anything but weak. Consumption expenditure grew at some 8 percent annually in real terms during the same period, as testified by the tripling or quadrupling in the penetration of consumer durables, such as color TV, refrigerator, washing machine, air conditioner, and cars.
The declining consumption share is attributable to the fact that the Chinese economy grew even faster than consumption. During the same period, 2 China's annual GDP growth hovered at around 10 per cent per annum, mainly powered by still stronger investment spending. Gross capital formation increased at a breakneck speed of over 12 percent per annum over these two decades, as its share in GDP rose from 38 percent to a s taggering 48 per cent by 2010. Therefore, such high and rising saving holds the key to understanding China's economic performance and imbalances. Such saving helped finance strong growth, while keeping average inflation at 2 percent in the past decade.
China's internal imbalances, a profile of domestic demand driven by "overinvestment," have more to do with high saving and l ittle to do with "anemic" consumer spending. The country's external imbalances, large current account surpluses underpinned by an export-led growth model, relate more to high saving rather than under-investment. Thus, any meaningful rebalancing of the Chinese economy begs the puzzling question of why China incurs much saving.
Solving this puzzle has proven difficult. The composition of China's rising gross national saving defies any simplistic interpretations. All three sectors in the Chinese economy-household, corporate, and government-are high savers (see Graph 1). Individually, these sectors in themselves may not be exceptional:
as a share of GDP, China's corporate saving at best rivals that of Japan, household saving is below that of India, and government saving is less than that of Korea. However, these combined and simultaneous high saving distinguishes China from its international peers. Corporate saving is the sum of depreciation and retained earnings.
Rising corporate earnings were mainly facilitated by enhanced corporate efficiency owing to massive enterprise restructuring in the late 1990s, slow wage growth capped by a large labor pool, and export expansion associated with China's 2001 WTO accession. Controversy remains over the roles of monopoly, subsidies, difficult external financing, and low dividends in boosting retained corporate earnings. However, the central question is not whether these distortions exist, but whether they worsened to become a principal driver behind the increase in corporate profits. With regard to the government, the rise in taxes on production, income taxes, social insurance contributions, and revenues from 5 land sales far exceeded the moderate growth in its consumption. As a result, the government saving rate increased from 3.3 percent of GDP in 2000 to 8.4 percent in 2008.
Some progress has been made in understanding corporate and government saving behaviors. Nevertheless, few attempts have explored the potential economy-wide forces influencing the Chinese aggregate saving in a consistent manner. For instance, rapid growth and i ndustrialization, a s izable pool of surplus labor, and a c ompressed demographic transition, together with developments in education and housing ownership reforms, may have combined to accentuate a complex transition process that features a falling labor share, boosts corporate profits, and weakens the state company-based social safety net. All these jointly increase the aggregate saving rate. China's WTO entry might accommodate this transition through increased foreign direct investment and expanding overseas export markets, thereby helping explain concurrent rising saving rate and strong consumer spending.
Much remains unexplored and to be learned, but the cumulative research efforts thus far should allow a gl impse at the medium-term prospects of the Chinese saving rate. We judge that this saving rate is probably approaching a plateau and will likely trend lower in the coming decade. If China's pool of surplus labor substantially diminishes in future years, one would expect the increased wage share in the Chinese economy, boosting consumption and dampening corporate profits. Should the anticipated acceleration of China's population aging set in later this decade, the potential output growth may slow and public social 6 spending may rise. Large corporate efficiency gains from painful restructuring may be one-off, and so is the positive income shock emanating from the WTO accession, especially following the global financial crisis.
In general, a g radual easing of China's saving rate from its current high level should eventually imply both a more balanced domestic demand and current account, given its already very high investment rate. However, in reality, rebalancing China's growth model is easier said than done, given the inherent tensions among internal and external rebalancing and growth. History shows that an increase in consumption with decline in saving relative to GDP often relates to measurable growth slowdown. In addition, domestic rebalancing does not necessarily bring about external rebalancing. Indeed, the Japanese experiences in the 1980s show that, during its transition from a mainly investment-driven model toward a more consumption-oriented economy (domestic rebalancing), its current account surplus widened considerably and per sistently as the economy slowed.
Three sets of government policy can facilitate the anticipated transition to a lower saving rate. First, a wide range of deregulations could be the most useful measure to manage tensions between growth and r ebalancing. These deregulations may include cutting entry barriers to the labor-intensive services sector, improving access to external financing for small firms, and reducing frictions in rural-urban labor migration. These pro-growth measures support jobs and wages, promoting consumption and easing corporate saving. Second, policies may aim to strengthen the social safety net covering healthcare, pension, and low-income supports. An expanded poverty reduction program is also helpful. However, care must be taken to focus on a broader and efficient coverage of basic social services, and avoid unsustainable generous welfare schemes. Third, checks should be put in place to restrain the government tendency to keep to itself a large portion of the growth dividend, without providing sufficient social services accordingly. Tax cuts and administrative fee reductions would be a good start in this regard.
